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Where does « Axial breakthrough » take place?  In the past, or in present narratives of 
the past? 
 
Violaine Sebillotte Cuchet
1
 
 
Abstract This article focuses on Vernant‟s thesis, masterfully developed in Les origines de la 
pensée grecque (1962) and translated into English in 1982. Vernant explained that between 
the 7th and the 2nd century BCE, one can note crucial modifications of the traditional and 
religious atmosphere, in civilizations as distant as China, India, Persia, Palestine and Greece. 
These turning points brought Confucianism, Buddhism, Zoroastrism, Prophetism, and, in 
Greece, Search for Truth. For historians, who claim their expertise on the past, 
methodological issues are at stake in this inquiry about an “axial age” or an “axial 
breakthrough”. First, there is the epistemological question of historiography, a present 
narrative of the past that cannot, from a scientific point of view – that of the historians –, erase 
varieties of past narratives (poetics, technical treatises, epigraphic decrees, vase paintings, 
etc.). Then, there is the new understanding of the constant interaction of what we call the 
political sphere with what we call the religious sphere, insofar as the distinction between a 
strictly political sphere, separate from the religious sphere, is now fully challenged. Finally, 
the polis as we understand it nowadays includes women‟s acts, as feminist scholarship has 
demonstrated through the past 35 years. This new depiction makes the “citizens” different: 
they can no longer be thought of as all the same and interchangeable.  
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As a French specialist of Ancient Greece, the notion of Axial Age and Axial Breakthrough, 
mostly used in relation with the origin of Thought, carried me back to Jean-Pierre Vernant‟s 
masterly book, Les origines de la pensée grecque (1962), translated into English with the title 
The Origins of Greek Thought (1982). In this book, the thesis of Vernant, who was mainly a 
philosopher and a Hellenist, not a historian (nor a social historian), was to describe a kind of 
“Axial Age”, the 6th century BCE in Greece. This period, actually extended to a wide range 
of years between the 8th and the 5th century, was characterized, according to Vernant, by the 
shift between Myth and Reason, between divine discourses and physical observations, 
arguments, and demonstrations: 
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If we wish to document the birth of this Greek rationality, to follow the path by which it 
managed to divest itself of a religious mentality, to indicate what it owed to myth and how 
far it went beyond it, we must compare and contrast with its Mycenaean background that 
turning point, from the eighth to the seventh century, where Greece made a new start and 
began to explore paths that were peculiarly its own: a period of decisive mutation that laid 
the foundations for the government of the polis at the very moment where the Orientalizing 
style was triumphant, and which ensured the advent of philosophy by secularizing political 
thought (Vernant 1982, p. 11). 
 
One will note that this way of considering the past is quite similar to the one taken by Bruno 
Snell in his book published in 1946 and entitled Die Entdeckung des Geistes, translated into 
French in 1994 with the title La découverte de l’esprit. La genèse de la pensée européenne 
chez les Grecs (Snell 1946, Onians 1951) According to Vernant, the geographic context of the 
“decisive mutation” was mainly Ionia, the Greek East, in Asia Minor. The actors were Thales 
of Miletos, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Solon of Athens, among others. The result was 
the conception of a new cosmos, organized in a political and rational order (by nomos - the 
Law - discussed by all). The result, and in fact, also the cause, was a new society where each 
one (in fact, Vernant was thinking of each male citizen) was in a relation of equality and 
reciprocity (democratic society and isonomia), and each decision could be discussed by each 
one (publicity of the written law): 
 
The advent of the polis, the birth of philosophy – the two sequences of phenomena are so 
closely linked that the origin of rational thought must be seen as bound up with the social 
and mental structures peculiar to the Greek city (Vernant 1982, p. 130). 
 
At one major point, Vernant put some distance between Snell and others: for him, like other 
scholars claiming the historicity of the “Greek spirit” (Momigliano 1994, p. 46), philosophy 
was not a pure Revelation. The birth of Reason was not a Miracle but an experience: 
 
The Milesian school did not witness the birth of Reason; rather, it devised a kind of 
reasoning, an early form of rationality (…) Reason itself was in essence political (…). 
When philosophy arose at Miletus, it was rooted in the political thought whose 
fundamental preoccupations it expressed and from which it borrowed a part of its 
vocabulary (Vernant 1982, pp. 130-131). 
 
In a way one can say that Reason was born thanks to the birth of political experience… As 
Andrew Ford wrote in 1989 in a critical review of Havelock‟s book, The Muse learns to write:  
 
Vernant traces the advent of philosophy to the advent of the polis (Ford 1989, p. 366). 
 
If it is not the birth of Philosophy or Reason, it is the birth of political thought, and thus of the 
polis, if I may suggest, that has to be understood as a kind of miracle. This view has been 
recently challenged by Richard Seaford in his book Money and the Early Greek Mind: even if 
the political explanation of the origin of Greek rational thought is still considered of great 
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importance, the use of money is, with Seaford‟s thesis, now to the fore (Seaford 2004, 
pp. 315-317). 
More than fifty years after Jean-Pierre Vernant‟s masterly analysis of what one would call an 
« axial breakthrough », i.e. the coming of age of the polis and concomitantly of Reason 
(Logos/Mythos), I am not sure French scholars of the 21st century are still comfortable with 
this kind of approach. The aim of this short note will be to understand why looking for 
breakthroughs inside the ancient civilizations, or inside the past, seems nowadays to most of 
us so strange. I should add that when I speak of “us” I am referring to historians, those who 
claim their expertise on the past and have this question in mind: what really happened? I 
should also add that my aim is to express my discomfort with the notion, not to propose any 
authoritative method. 
Jean-Pierre Vernant himself, in his Preface of 1987 (for the new French edition of his book), 
distanced himself from the thesis of 1962. He gave priority to the diversity of rationalities 
(philosophical discourses, medical treatises, historical narratives, technical treatises…). He 
also brought to the fore the inaccurate division between mythos and logos, one might say 
between irrationality and rationality. He took account of the fact that mythos and logos were 
actually quite synonymous before the 5th century when, in historical or philosophical treatises 
(and maybe only there), they became antagonistic notions. 
Nevertheless, Vernant, in the new preface of 1987, underlined his dept to A. I. Zaïtzev who 
was precisely following the path opened by Karl Jaspers. He explained that between the 7th 
and the 2nd century BCE, one can note crucial modifications of the traditional and religious 
atmosphere, in civilizations as distant as China, India, Persia, Palestine and Greece. These 
turning points brought Confucianism, Buddhism, Zoroastrism, Prophetism, and, in Greece, 
Search for Truth. Vernant added that the Greek specificity was that the movement was not 
displayed inside religion but beside (or outside) it. The search for truth did not use the 
religious medium but was developed by individual personalities, argumentation, and 
cumulative science.  
Still, Vernant set the Greek polis as a specific social and intellectual context, the context of a 
city constituted by the participation of citizens in collective matters. Lloyd focused rather, as 
Seaford analyzed it, on the “unprecedented freedom of public debate characteristic of the 
polis” (Seaford 2004, p. 176, his emphasis). Seaford did not question this. He illuminated 
another factor, the “rapid monetisation of the Greek city-states of the sixth century BC” 
(Seaford 2004, p. 315). 
As I suggested at the very beginning, different issues are at stake in this inquiry about an 
“axial age” or an “axial breakthrough”. They are mainly methodological issues and my 
purpose is to open the discussion on these issues. I will discuss first the epistemological 
question of historiography, a contemporary narration about the past that cannot, from a 
scientific point of view – that of the historians –, erase varieties of past narratives. Then, I will 
demonstrate how far contemporary scholars are from Vernant‟s conception of the Greek polis 
and its political activity, mainly because of the constant interaction of what we call the 
political sphere with what we call the religious sphere. Then, I will draw a picture of the polis 
that is very different from that of Vernant and Seaford because the one we know nowadays is 
including women‟s acts, as feminist scholarship has demonstrated through the past 30 years.  
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The idea that history (time) is going on like a homogeneous flow. 
 
Vernant was well aware of the difficulty in giving a present narrative of ancient societies and 
he called attention to the variety of rationalities in the past (as did Snell). Nowadays, nearly 
30 years after the new preface of 1987, the way of considering historical narratives has 
changed a great deal and the balance between the necessity of producing a present narrative 
and the scruples of giving an exact depiction of the variety of ancient rationalities has shifted. 
Classicists and historians of modern periods are very cautious in writing their history and try 
not to make generalizations from the documents they use. I think that nobody would anymore 
write about Greek Thought, considered as a single entity that would have inspired society, 
religion, and politics, and that would have spread throughout the Greek world: every 
discursive genre, because of its pragmatic aspects, is thought of as producing a specific kind 
of reality. On this point, one can easily read a lot of very intelligent works, dealing with 
epistemological issues, particularly since the famous Linguistic Turn published by Richard 
Rorty in 1967 (Delacroix 2010, pp. 476-490), but we can also observe it very easily. 
 
Take for example Xenophon‟s treatise titled Oeconomicus (Todd and Henderson 2013). It 
pictured a good citizen, living on his farm, with his spouse and some slaves. The treatise has 
been used as a good example for a vivid depiction of the everyday life of a quite rich 
Athenian woman: she was raised to get married in her teens and was only trained to work at 
the loom (spin and weave). She became, when married, the head of the house and planned the 
circulation of goods (grain, wool, oil, fruits) from the outside to the inside and then, if 
possible, to the marketplace. She controlled the exchanges and expenses. She also took care of 
everyone in the house: slaves must be in good health. Xenophon gave the name of the 
gentleman farmer and spouse of this woman, Ischomachos, not of his wife. Some scholars 
conclude, from that text and others (especially Attic discourses composed to be read in front 
of courts or assemblies), that in Athens (and Greece as a whole) women were at home, living 
inside like Penelope at the loom, and that their names should not be communicated in public, 
for it is a source of shame. Attic vases showing women at home, or among women, and doing 
housework, seem to confirm this fact, considered as the social norm: men were outside, in the 
public sphere, women were at home, silent and under control of the masculine members of 
their family.  
Thus, if we take into account the various dedications, honorific or funerary steles, i.e., 
epigraphic documents, we would be stunned to read the names of many Athenian (or Greek) 
women, acting in the city, outside their houses, and having a prominent place in public areas: 
for example, an inscribed stone notes the name of the woman who acted as a witness in a sale 
in Olynthus, in the 4
th
 century. The contract between Xenon and Euboulides recorded the two 
guarantors‟ names, Pytheeas, son of Pythion and Philaina, daughter of Heron. Philaina did not 
need any kurios to be a guarantor (Game 2008, p. 62). The stone, from 350 BCE, was found 
in situ, in the ruins of a house located near the northeast corner of the agora of Olynthus. At 
the entrance of the house, one could read the name of Philaina (Game 2008, pp. 171-172). The 
stone was visible to anyone walking along the agora of Olynthus and this publicity about her 
(like the publicity for the men listed on the sale contract), was not a disgrace. Various lease 
agreements named women as renters for public lands. The agreements are inscribed on stone 
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and erected in public spaces for everyone to be informed. In Thespiai during the third century, 
in Mylasa during the 4
th
, in Tenos during the 4
th
 and, in that instance, for public sales of 
private lands, women are listed and described as acting in the same way as men (Pernin 
2014). 
A fragmentary inventory of the sanctuary of Artemis Brauronia in the Athenian Acropolis 
lists more than one hundred names of women who dedicated textiles to the divinity at the 4
th
 
century (Brøns 2014). One could also think of Lysimache‟s statue, described by Pausanias 
and erected on the Athenian acropolis, probably by her son, and celebrating the woman who 
has been Athena Polias‟ priestess during more than sixty years (Georgoudi 1993). Many 
epigraphic documents show women in action: at the end of the fourth century, Philia offered 
to Demeter and Kore a statue of her deceased daughter Philylla, named with her patronymic 
and demotic. Philia is named with her own name, without any tutor. She gave the commission 
to a man named Kephisodotos and acted as a man would (Kron 1996).  
 
Everyone will easily conclude that one kind of narrative production (such as didactic treatises, 
one might say normative treatises) does not show the same picture of the past (life in Greek 
cities) as another (archeological documentation). When historians are analyzing documents, 
the question they have to ask is the one of their pragmatic use (what for? which audience? 
where?) instead of giving general explanation about their meanings. During the past decades, 
scholarship has demonstrated that some women could be free and active in public when others 
could live under the mastery of their fathers or husbands. Neither is there, from the past to the 
present, a single and homogeneous story for women, nor for the society as a whole. Past 
narratives, whether they are inscribed on stone or drawn on vases or written on papyri or 
transcribed on manuscripts, are always engaged in a social function: each tells its own truth. 
The contemporary narrative historians produce about the past could not ignore that. No one 
can ignore the competing past narratives, each one being a real and specific happening, 
mainly when there is no statistic about how people acted or thought, on average. In a way the 
social norm historians put to the fore is always only a social norm among others. 
 
Religious sphere and political sphere  
 
Vernant located the “breakthrough” (to employ the notion we are discussing, which is not his 
as he himself spoke of the “advent of the polis, the birth of philosophy”) in the “decline of 
myth” when “the first sages brought human order under discussion and sought to define it, to 
render it in formulas accessible to the intelligence, and to apply to it the standard of measure 
and number”. In this way “evolved a strictly political thought, separate from religion, with its 
own vocabulary, concepts, principles, and theoretical aims” (Vernant 1982, p. 131). Yet in 
1990 a very influential article of Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood showed that there did exist, 
during the classical Age, a “polis religion” (Sourvinou-Inwood 1990). Julia Kindt recently 
criticized the notion but the notion of polis religion is still unchallenged. As Kindt resumed, 
the polis religion operated on three levels: first in providing “the major context for religious 
beliefs and practices”, then in offering “a common set of ideologies and values, such as shared 
notions of purity and pollution, sacred and profane, human and divine” and finally in 
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constituting “the basic unit” through which “the panhellenic dimension of Greek religion (..) 
was accessed” (Kindt 2009).  
 
In a sense, we can conclude that this now largely shared view, placing the political at the top, 
is not far from Vernant‟s. But the major shift is that the political, in Sourvinou‟s depiction, is 
no longer independent from religion. The political surpasses religion, including it. And, 
actually, it cannot be free of religion. How can we represent, nowadays, “political thought” 
(except by reducing it to political theory) separate from religion? New works underline the 
close connection between political groups, organized as tribes or phratries, and religious 
rituals and between political acts (on various levels) and religious beliefs. For example, the 
foundation of the Athenian Cleisthenic tribes was legitimated in the Delphi sanctuary; a war 
could not be undertaken without agreement of the gods, nor a political assembly. 
To illustrate this embeddedness of political and religious spheres, we can think, among other 
documents, of this lead tablet recording a consultation made by the Chaones (an ethnos living 
in North-West Greece) at the sanctuary of Zeus at Dodona (Epirus) before 330 BCE: 
 
Good fortune. The city of the Chaones requests Zeus Naios and Dione to answer whether it 
is better and more expedient that they transfer the building of the temple of Athena the 
Citadel-Goddess (Davies 2002, p. 249). 
 
The response – still to be discussed, and in this perspective the final decision is a political 
one – is given by priests. 
Even philosophical schools could be located in, and identified with, a sacred grove  (Ismard 
2010, p. 188): in the Academy, in Athens, Plato was teaching in or beside the Mousaion, 
sanctuary of the Muses, in 387 BCE. Diogenes Laërtius indicated that Speusippos erected 
statues of the Charites (the Graces) in the sanctuary of the Mousai built by Plato in the 
Academy (the Athenian gymnasium honoring, among other heroes or divinities, the hero 
Academus and where civic education took place). 
To conclude, it becomes more and more difficult to discuss and speak of “the polis” as a 
specific political agent. The historical agents are the assemblies and other institutions (such as 
courts of justice), the magistrates and other individuals. The “State” in itself needs to be 
defined with much more precision (Ismard 2014). 
 
The conception of the city as a collection of citizens organized to share power and 
participate in collective matters is less a certainty than an issue, at least for feminist 
research. 
 
Vernant wrote in 1962 that Reason, the result of the Axial breakthrough (to re-use the implicit 
notion), is “a creature of the city” (Vernant 1982, p. 132). And the city, according to Vernant, 
is the society of the citizens, free men exercising their political rights and their reason in 
assemblies. In 1987, he did not modify this picture. Somehow, his question was less the 
Greek thought (which might be analyzed in philosophical treatises) than the political and 
social effects and realizations of “Greek Thought”. 
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According to Vernant (Vernant 1963, p. 19), the political sphere was an exclusively male 
sphere. Vernant formulated here a very common idea of his generation, largely developed in 
France by Claude Mossé, Nicole Loraux and Pierre Vidal-Naquet (Loraux 1981; Vidal-
Naquet 1981; Mossé 1983; Mossé 1993). The latter fathered the widespread formula 
describing the city as a “citizen club”. Actually, the “citizen club” was a way to express the 
feeling of sameness that was thought to be the firm cornerstone of equality and political 
thought. Because citizens were thought to be all the same (sharing manliness?), they were 
thought of as interchangeable. This thought explained the political abstraction of citizenship: 
one could be a ruler and then be governed by someone else. The point is that being equal and 
interchangeable, citizens accepted the rule (Aristotle, Politics III, 1275a 22-23 and 1275b17-
21: Rackham 1977). In these years (the 60s and 70s) men and women were thought of as 
absolutely different (the Same and the Other) and gender was considered as the major 
criterion of social and symbolic division that should be explored and challenged, even by 
ancient societies themselves (Zeitlin 1996). 
 
The scene has now completely changed even if many scholars do not take the results of 
feminist research into account as I do. A good example is the recent book of Andreas 
Fahrmeir, Citizenship. The rise and fall of a modern concept. Acccording to Fahrmeir, the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen by the French National Assembly on 
August 26th of 1789, “was a defining moment for the history of a concept of social 
organization which has since become central to everyday life, political controversies, and 
academic research: citizenship” (Fahrmeir 2007, p. 1). According to him “as the invention of 
citizenship was a political project, it is not surprising that formal citizenship [legal rights to 
vote and be elected] was closely linked to political citizenship” (Fahrmeir 2007, p. 228). 
Before that time (the invention of formal citizenship), one can only speak of local experiments 
of inclusion and exclusion, one can only speak of social citizenship (membership). Thus, as 
we said before, various feminist scholars pointed out the women‟s participation, as female 
citizens, in collective matters: rituals, public exhibitions of prestige, economic agency. They 
also put at some distance the social efficacy of the legal sphere (Hunter 1989; Foxhall 1996; 
Agut-Labordère and Veïsse 2014) and the idea of a confinement of the freewomen inside the 
house (Nevett 1999; Nevett 2013). They underlined the polarity between free members of the 
city and slaves, and, doing so, moved the boundaries between the Same and the Other. 
In 1987, an American scholar, Cynthia Patterson, demonstrated that Ancient Greek used the 
word citizen (politai) both for freemen and freewomen. The word indicates, in the plural 
form, the inhabitants of the city, the members of the community and the territory, since 
Homer (Patterson 1986). Used in the singular form, beside the word citizen in the masculine 
form (polites), the Greek language used a feminine form, politis, to refer to the feminine 
equivalent of polites even in a political context, for example, in speeches before the Athenian 
assemblies or in discourses engaged in defining what is the polis and what kind of individuals 
are the politai (Blok 2005; Sebillotte Cuchet 2016). It is therefore not so surprising to read 
two public decrees from Dodona in Epirus, inscribed on the same stele and dating from the 
4th c. that gave the politeia to two women, Philista and Phinto (Davies 2002, pp. 234-258). 
As women‟s social participation has been widely shown by scholars, especially in rituals and 
in relation to gods and goddesses, the notion of separate spheres, religion on the one hand and 
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politics on the other, has been more and more challenged. Only freemen could belong to the 
legal sphere, the sphere of the publicly-made decision. That does not mean that all freemen 
felt concerned (many did not have the time and others did not care about politics, a notion 
Plato described for the first time as the art of governing). As a priestess, a woman could share 
the same prestige as a priest: she could also interfere in public assemblies (the Boule for 
certain, no evidence for the ecclesia yet) and manifest the power and the authority of the 
divine (Georgoudi 1993). She could be in a superior position to public magistrates (Herodotus 
5.72: Waterfield and Dewald 1998). The participation in government, a major argument in the 
work of Aristotle to describe citizenship and political action, has been reduced in importance 
weakened. Political participation, in the Greek meaning of “meteichein tes poleos”, was not 
confined to what we used to call “political” assemblies. Ancient and modern citizenship are 
definitively not the same. 
 
Philosophical works from Simone de Beauvoir (de Beauvoir 1949) to Judith Butler (Butler 
1990), and including Monique Wittig (Wittig 1976) for example, showed that the notion of 
Alterity applied to women is a category of discourse pointing out one single element in the 
body, the male/female differentiated capacity for generation. Other scholars have 
demonstrated that in Ancient Greece, this kind of differentiation certainly operated, but only 
in limited types of discourses (medical treatises and stereotypical rhetoric – tragedy or 
comedy), whereas individuals were also thought of as human beings as opposed to beasts, 
gods and goddesses. I refer here to scholarship produced in Paris on women and gender 
history in Antiquity (Ernoult and Sebillotte Cuchet 2007; Boehringer and Sebillotte Cuchet 
2011; Sebillotte Cuchet 2012, pp. 573-603; Boehringer and V. Sebillotte Cuchet 2013, pp. 
199-216). Mostly, freemen and freewomen were thought of as sharing the same status and 
ideology (controlling oneself – sophrosune) (Marchiandi 2011). Social distinctions, for 
example between the best among the citizen (epitimoi) and the worst among them (atimoi), 
included both men and women (Aischines, Against Timarchus 183: Adams 1968). 
 
Even “Greece” could not be thought of as a whole. When Vernant was writing his book, it 
was usual to speak of Greece as a whole even when discussing very fragmentary pieces of 
evidence, mostly coming from a cultural tradition elaborated in Athens (the Pisistratids were 
very active in collecting documents of panhellenic value (Davison 1955, p. 1-21). Many 
works have demonstrated that political experiments were extremely diverse in Greece and 
rooted in intercultural exchanges with other Mediterranean cultures (Brock and Hodkinson 
2002). According to Davies, the Aristotelian picture of “the city” (one single form for the 
whole Greek world) is nowadays challenged and cannot anymore be considered as a full 
picture of the Greek experience of the city (politics): 
 
Conscious as he plainly was of the Greek lawgiver tradition, throughout the Politics he 
tends to regard a polity as something created by a political engineer and applied to a 
society in order to achieve certain objectives. He has little time for the alternative view of a 
governmental system as something which is secondary to, derives its shape from, and is 
gradual, organic, and unplanned outgrowth of, the essential components of the society 
which evolves it and is « administered » by it (Davies 2002, p. 238).   
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In the end, the polis does not look the same as Vernant‟s: the polis is an association of free 
people, men and women; the political decisions are not disconnected from the still strong 
religious background (there is no secularism). What he called “political thought”, even if it 
did exist, might be a very narrow social experiment, held by a handful of people. We must 
still consider why such thought appears, but the reason is unlikely to be an Axial 
Breakthrough involving the entire society. 
 
New documents (mostly epigraphic evidence), heterogeneity of thoughts (contentious 
perspectives), and empirical methodology have made it very difficult for any scholar to adopt 
an evolutionist point of view. Could any breakthrough be located in an Axial Age? That is the 
sense of the question: where does « Axial breakthrough » take place? Is it in the whole society 
– assuming we can speak for the whole- or in a few discursive practices? The question should 
be why one of these past narratives, the one focused on the advent of Reason, became so 
dominant in our present narration of the past? Why did it become so influential over time? 
Historiography, often underestimated, is a fundamental task for all historians. 
From the point of view of the historian‟s practice, the breakthrough is mostly in the question 
asked, in the narrative each one constructs, not somewhere in the past. Nowadays, women are 
back in the city, society is back in the political sphere, and, with society, the rituals and beliefs 
in gods, heroes and divine forces are all back. “Axial breakthrough” is a concept quite at 
variance with our new methodology: it is a concept belonging to a specific historiographical 
narrative. I guess its analysis cannot elude the historiographical narrative that constructs it. 
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